Taylor’s “Libertarianism”

                                                                          THE THEORY OF AGENCY

What is Taylor’s concept of agent causation?

Does it accurately reflect what people take themselves to bedoing when they perform action?

Why or why not?

(24) The only conception of action that accords with our data isone according to which men— and perhaps some other things too—aresometimes, but of course not always, self-determining beings; thatis, beings which are sometimes the causes of their own behavior. Inthe case of an action that is free, it must be such that it iscaused by the agent who performs it, but such that no antecedentconditions were sufficient for his performing just that action. Inthe case of an action that is both free and rational, it must besuch that the agent who performed it did so for some reason, butthis reason cannot have been the cause of it.

(25) Now this conception fits what men take themselves to be;namely, beings who act, or who are agents, rather than things thatare merely acted upon, and whose behavior is simply the causalconsequence of conditions which they have not wrought. When Ibelieve that I have done something, I do believe that it was I whocaused it to be done, I who made something happen, and not merelysomething within me, such as one of my own subjective states, whichis not identical with myself. If I believe that something notidentical with myself was the cause of my behavior—some eventwholly external to myself, for instance, or even one internal tomyself, such as a nerve impulse, volition, or whatnot—then I cannotregard that behavior as being an act of mine, unless I furtherbelieve that I was the cause of that external or internal event. Mypulse, for example, is caused and regulated by certain conditionsexisting within me, and not by myself. I do not, accordingly,regard this activity of my body as my action, and would be no moretempted to do so if I became suddenly conscious within myself ofthose conditions or impulses that produce it. This behavior withwhich I have nothing to do, behavior that is not within myimmediate control, behavior that is not only not free activity, butnot even the activity of an agent to begin with; it is nothing buta mechanical reflex. Had I never learned that my very life dependson this pulse beat, I would regard it with complete indifference,as something foreign to me, like the oscillations of a clockpendulum that I idly contemplate.

(26) Now this conception of activity, and of an agent who is thecause of it, involves two rather strange metaphysical notions thatare never applied elsewhere in nature. The first is that of a selfor person—for example, a man—who is not merely a collection ofthings or events, but a substance and a self-moving being. For onthis view it is a man himself, and not merely some

part of him or something within him, that is the cause of hisown activity. Now we certainly do not know that a man is anythingmore than an assemblage of physical things and processes,

which act in accordance with those laws that describe thebehavior of all other physical things and processes. Even though aman is a living being, of enormous complexity, there isnothing,

apart from the requirements of this theory, to suggest that hisbehavior is so radically different in its origin from that of otherphysical objects, or that an understanding of it must be soughtin

some metaphysical realm wholly different from that appropriateto the understanding of non- living things. Second, this conceptionof activity involves an extraordinary conception of

causation, according to which an agent, which is a substance andnot an event, can nevertheless be the cause of an event. Indeed, ifhe is a free agent then he can, on this conception, cause an eventto occur—namely, some act of his own—without anything else causinghim to do so. This means that an agent is sometimes a cause,without being an antecedent sufficient condition; for if I affirmthat I am the cause of some act of mine, then I am plainly notsaying that my very existence is sufficient for its occurrence,which would be absurd. If I say that my hand causes my pencil tomove, then I am saying that the motion of my hand is, under theother conditions then prevailing, sufficient for the motion of thepencil. But if I then say that I cause my hand to move, I am notsaying anything remotely like this, and surely not that the motionof my self is sufficient for the motion of my arm and hand, sincethese are the only things about me that are moving.

(27) This conception of the causation of events by beings orsubstances that are not events is, in fact, so different from theusual philosophical conception of a cause that it should not evenbear the same name, for \"being a cause\" ordinarily just means\"being an antecedent sufficient condition or set of conditions.\"Instead, then, of speaking of agents as causing their own acts, itwould perhaps be better to use another word entirely, and say, forinstance, that they originate them, initiate them, or simply thatthey perform them. Now this is on the face of it a dubious

conception of what a man is. Yet it is consistent with our data,reflecting the presuppositions of deliberation, and appears to bethe only conception that is consistent with them, as determinismand simple indeterminism are not. The theory of agency avoids theabsurdities of simple indeterminism by conceding that humanbehavior is caused, while at the same time avoiding thedifficulties of determinism by denying that every chain of causesand effects is infinite. Some such causal chains, on this view,have beginnings, and they begin with agents themselves. Moreover,if we are to suppose that it is sometimes up to me what I do, andunderstand this in a sense which is not consistent withdeterminism, we must suppose that I am an agent or a being whoinitiates his own actions, sometimes under conditions which do notdetermine what action he shall perform. Deliberation becomes, onthis view, something that is not only possible but quite rational,for it does make sense to deliberate about activity that is trulymy own and that depends in its outcome upon me as its author, andnot merely upon something more or less esoteric that is supposed tobe intimately associated with me, such as my thoughts, volitions,choices, or whatnot.

(28) One can hardly affirm such a theory of agency with completecomfort, however, and wholly without embarrassment, for theconception of men and their powers which is involved in it is

strange indeed, if not positively mysterious. In fact, one canhardly be blamed here for simply denying our data outright, ratherthan embracing this theory to which they do most certainly

point. Our data—to the effect that men do sometimes deliberatebefore acting, and that when they do, they presuppose among otherthings that it is up to them what they are going to do—rest uponnothing more than fairly common consent. These data might simply beillusions. It might in fact be that no man ever deliberates, butonly imagines that he does, that from pure conceit he supposeshimself to be the master of his behavior and the author of hisacts. Spinoza has suggested that if a stone, having been throwninto the air, were suddenly to become conscious, it would supposeitself to be the source of its own motion, being then conscious ofwhat it was doing but not aware of the real cause of its behavior.Certainly men are sometimes mistaken in believing that they arebehaving as a result of choice deliberately arrived at. A manmight, for example, easily imagine that his embarking uponmatrimony is the result of the most careful and rationaldeliberation, when in fact the causes, perfectly sufficient forthat behavior, might be of an entirely physiological, unconsciousorigin. If it is sometimes false that we deliberate and then act asthe result of a decision deliberately arrived at, even when wesuppose it to be true, it might always be false. No one seems able,as we have noted, to describe deliberation without metaphors, andthe conception of a thing's being \"within one's power\" or \"up tohim\" seems to defy analysis or definition altogether, if taken in asense which the theory of agency appears to require.

(29) These are, then, dubitable conceptions, despite their beingso well implanted in the common sense of mankind. Indeed, when weturn to the theory of fatalism, we shall find formidablemetaphysical considerations which appear to rule them outaltogether. Perhaps here, as elsewhere in metaphysics, we should becontent with discovering difficulties, with seeing what is and whatis not consistent with such convictions as we happen to have, andthen drawing such satisfaction as we can from the realization that,no matter where we begin, the world is mysterious and the men whotry to understand it are even more so. This realization can, withsome justification, make one feel wise, even in the fullrealization of his ignorance.