Two AH-64 attack helicopters were on an armed reconnaissancemission patrolling a vast mountainous area in Afghanistan byfollowing the terrain at low altitude, so they would not be avisual target for any Taliban hostiles, and also utilizing thehills and forests as natural sound barriers to muffle their rotors.Randomly, one of the aircraft would “pop up” so it could visuallyinspect the surroundings for suspicious activities.
On this late afternoon as one “popped up” the pilot spottedactivity within the range of his missiles. From his pre-missionbriefing he knew there were Afghan government forces operating inthe territories as well as civilians from surrounding villagesgoing about their normal daily affairs. He knew that friendlyforces in the area had no capability of controlling his aircraftfor attacks, so he was responsible for ensuring the safe deliveryof all aviation ordnance. Moreover, intelligence reports indicatedthere were possible Taliban troop movements in the area as well asthe possibility of an ISIS enemy armored column moving through. Thetype of weapons that he would select to fire depended on the targettype. For a troop convoy he would use either his 30mm main gun oranti-personnel rockets, while for an armored column he would usearmor piercing hellfire missiles. If he decided that he was facinga troop convoy, he’d decide between the helicopter’s 30 mm main gunand the anti-personnel rockets depending on the size of the convoy.Obviously, if he believed that the activity was caused byfriendlies (allies or civilians), he wouldn’t fire at all.
• If the pilot decided the target was an enemy troop convoy,then the military strategists would score the battle damageassessment (BDA) on the troop convoy as being “worth” 250units.
• If he was wrong and, instead, it turned out to be an ISISarmored column, then the BDA was rated at 350 units because whilethe rockets could effectively immobilize the convoy, they would notachieve destruction of the targets.
• On the other hand, if a tragic mistake was made and thetarget turned out to be friendly combatants, the BDA would be ratedas -500 units
• Yet, if they appeared to be civilian, BDA would be rated at-200. The smaller “penalty” for a strike on civilians was sinceoftentimes apparent civilians did turn out to be Talibancombatants.
• Likewise, if he decided that the observed activity wascaused by an armored column, he would select the anti-armormissiles. If in fact, the activity was caused by an ISIS armoredcolumn, the BDA would be rated at 600 units while if it was a troopcolumn, the BDA would be rated at 200 units because of the minimaleffect on a troop column compared to rockets.
• In the unfortunate event that the activity was caused bycivilians, the strike would be assessed at -100 units.
• While if he accidentally struck friendly Afghan armycombatants, the BDA would be assessed at – 300 units.
The pilot was excited at the unexpected appearance of apossible target of opportunity and conducted a Collateral DamageEstimate call with a ground analyst to ensure that rules ofengagement were followed before executing a strike. Then, with anadrenalin rush, he feverishly prepared for action havingmomentarily forgotten all the information provided to him and theother attack helicopter’s pilot during that morning’s intelligencebriefing.
Q1. Determine how he would have identified the cause of theactivity he spotted (civilian, Afghan army, Taliban or armoredISIS) depending on his attitude toward risk.
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Moments later, his years of training and experience kicked inand his professionalism took over. Based on what he was able to seecombined with the intelligence briefings he received, he put theprobability of the activity to be caused by friendly forces at 0.05and by civilians at 0.15. However, he thought there was a greatlikelihood that the activity was caused by enemy forces and heestimated the probability of it being caused by a Taliban convoy at0.5 and by an armored ISIS column at 0.3.
Q2. What course of action would maximize his expectedMU’s?
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Fully aware of the negative consequences of firing on friendlyforces or civilians, the Department of the Army decided to ask thePentagon to request a special earmark, requiring Congressionalapproval, in next year’s budget for the Defense Advanced ResearchProject Agency (DARPA) to issue an RFP for the development of atechnology to help air crews improve their ability of identifyingfriends from foes in battle conditions. Such an approval willrequire persuasive argument as well as analysis of the potentialbenefit that such a technology would have on improving the militaryutility of the attack helicopter.
Q3 How would you optimistically quantify the military utilityof having such a technology developed?
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Having successfully argued the benefits of such a technology,the Pentagon awarded a “proof of concept” contract to a majordefense contractor, to develop a sensor capability for the attackhelicopters for their aircrews to enhance their targetingdecisions. As part of the contract, the contractor delivered 25prototypes that allowed the use of a battery of sensors to better“see” potential targets. The signals from these sensors, whichincluded radar and forward looking infrared imagery consolidated toprovide a composite picture.
The prototypes were put through extensive testing andeventually, to validate the test results, were deployed onhelicopters. No technology is perfect, but the track record ofthese sensor fusion prototypes was excellent as given by thefollowing track record:
• Of the times the sensor had indicated the presence of athreat (troops or armor), 65% of the time it correctly identifiedTaliban troop convoys and 90% of the time it correctly identifiedISIS armored columns.
• Conversely, when the sensor indicated the presence of athreat, 1% of the time the “threat” consisted of Afghan governmentforces and 5% of the time civilians.
Q4 Based on this performance, should the Army issue a majorprocurement contract to equip all Apaches with this newtechnology?
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Although the use of the sensors is tempting, it also exposesthe helicopter to counter measures and increases the probabilitythat the hunter will become hunted. If the pilot chose to use thesensors, then the resulting benefits would have to be balancedagainst the risk of coming under fire.
• If the activity spotted using the sensors is actually afriendly force or civilians, then there is no risk of coming underfire.
• However, if that activity is actually a Taliban convoy, thenchance of being hit is only 1%.
• On the other hand, if it is an armored ISIS column, then hewill come under fire from imbedded anti-air defense artillery andhis chance of being hit will be 10%.
• If he’s hit, he will not be able to act upon the sensorinformation.
• If he isn’t hit, he will not know that he came under fireand go through the normal protocols as though nothing hadhappened.
Q5 How do the sensor-use probabilities impact the decision toprocure them for the Apache force?
