Q. How these 3 articles are related or what are the big differences between them?

1.

While a number of principalagent relations exist in the VC cycle, our model focuses on a lesser-studied perspective by viewing the VC as an agent of the entrepreneur. This leads to the argument that knowledge of an investor's past behavior can lend toward predicting the odds of incurring future agency coststhus becoming influential in the entrepreneurs' willingness to partner decision. We use a two-study approach to test this conceptualization empirically. Employing metric conjoint analysis, we begin in study one by decomposing the decisions of entrepreneurs pertaining to their willingness to partner with a prospective investor. Our analysis of 550 decisions reveals that knowledge of explicit ethical or unethical behavior profoundly shapes the entrepreneurs' willingness to partner. Interaction effects indicate that factors previously shown to drive entrepreneurial evaluations, such as investor value-added services and investment track record (Fairchild, 2011; Valliere and Peterson, 2007), become largely contingent upon and in some cases subjugated by an investor's ethical reputation. Study two takes a complementary approach via utilization of a traditional between-subjects scenario experiment designed to examine further the influence of ethical reputation as well as delineate nuances of interactive relationships. We find that when entrepreneurs develop their own perceptions about the behaviors of investors (i.e., they are not overtly told whether a VC is ethical or unethical), the ethical dimension still emerges as a highly influential factor. Moreover, study two documents the extent to which contextual and individual-level differences influence the role of an investor's ethical reputation. Here, we find that as the consequences of rejecting the funding offer become more severe, entrepreneurs become increasingly tolerant of partnering with an unethical investor. We also find, somewhat counter-intuitively, that high fear of failure entrepreneurs is less willing to partner with unethical VCs than their low fear of failure counterparts. Taken together, our multi-study approach connects business ethics and entrepreneurship by advancing our understanding of the role ethics plays as entrepreneurs evaluate and select potential equity investors. Our findings also offer new insights regarding the conditions under which ethical reputation may be more or less impactful. Collectively, these findings make a number of contributions to theory and practice while also setting the stage for important avenues of future research.

2.

VCs interact with various counterparties. VCs raise capital from qualified investors. They invest in startup companies and deal with their founders and other equity investors. VCs often syndicate their investments with other VCs or invest in follow-up rounds in which the original VCs do not. Finally, when VCs exit their investment in a startup they either sell the startup to a strategic acquirer or take it public by selling shares to IPO investors with the intermediation of investment banks. In this section we describe the nature of the four most important contractual relationships in the VC industry with a special focus on potential for opportunistic behavior by the VCs. We also discuss possible roles for reputation in limiting such behavior. This paper performs the first systematic analysis of the role of reputation in policing opportunistic behavior by venture capitalists towards four types of counterparties: entrepreneurs, investors, other VCs, and acquirers of VCbacked startups. We find that more reputable VCs are less likely to be litigated on a per deal basis. Following lawsuits, litigated VCs invest in fewer deals, raise significantly less capital, and syndicate with fewer VCs than their peers. Relative to other litigated VCs, VCs that are defendants to multiple lawsuits suffer a larger negative impact on their business relationships. At the same time, VCs sued by founders subsequently invest in fewer deals and raise significantly less capital, and these effects are more pronounced when the VCs lose such lawsuits. Our results suggest that reputational mechanisms act to prevent widespread abuse of power by VCs and that litigation can enhance reputational enforcement mechanisms by informing other counterparties of VC misbehavior. Overall, we present evidence that the VC industry uses a complex web of legal and nonlegal mechanisms to ameliorate the possible abuse of contractual discretion by VCs. Reputational mechanisms can complement contracts and courts in penalizing VC opportunism ex post and reducing the likelihood of opportunism ex ante, and thus can improve the efficiency of this important market for financing innovation and growth.

3.

This paper sought to develop propositions regarding the impact of perceived unethical behavior on the conflict process between angel investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Using case studies, we proposed a model to help highlight the role of perceived unethical behavior in conflict emergence, conflict management, conflict escalation and conflicts effects on investorentrepreneur partnerships. Future research can build on this study in several ways. First, unethical issues and their effects may vary depending on the stage of the financing partnership cycle or on the financing source used. Even though variation was clearly present in terms of unethical behavior presented by angel investors and venture capitalists, our limited sample size does not allow us to generate finer-grained insights regarding differences between the two. Second, even though our cases indicate that perceived unethical behavior is omnipresent, more research is needed to understand whether its presence varies depending on the degree of professionalization of the respective risk capital markets. In more mature markets, investors may conform more to governance and ethical guidelines to protect their reputation, while entrepreneurs may be better informed regarding the rules of the game. As such, opposed perceptions of (un)ethical behavior due to overoptimistic business plans and broken promises of added value may be tempered. Finally, future research should examine the validity of our model adopting a quantitative research approach. The aim of this article was to deepen the field of the darker sides of the relationships between angel investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. As such, our objective was to raise questions and to encourage critical thinking concerning the role of ethical issues in conflicts between these parties. This study also has practical implications: the world of entrepreneurship and venture capital is a hard one where conflicts are inevitable. Parties engaged in conflicts may have different views on what is ethically acceptable. In venture investments, ambiguous situations with different perceptions often rest upon differences between legal and ethical views. The venture capital industry has largely been influenced by its Anglo-Saxon origins with a strong emphasis on contracts and compliance. In addition to respecting legal aspects, an ethical attitude however is necessary to build trust and improve collaboration between partners. Both investors and entrepreneurs should reflect on the ethical impact of their attitude and confront their behavior with their code of conduct.6 As in all fields, the hard thingbut also the essenceabout codes is to implement them. Recognizing the ethical issues involved will help foster ethical behavior among various partners in the investment process and will increase the chances of successful collaboration. To conclude, our study provides several important contributions. It contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by (1) addressing a call for more research on investorinvestee relationships in general (Lockett et al. 2006) and their darker sides in specific (Parhankangas and Landstrom 2006) and (2) addressing a call for more cross-disciplinary research connecting the fields of business ethics and entrepreneurship (Harris et al. 2009). This study also informs conflict literature by more clearly disentangling the links between conflict and unethical behavior.