please read this and answer to question 3, 7 , and 11 in simple and easy language: Thank you

THERE WAS A TIME WHEN THE "MADE IN JAPAN" label brought a predictable smirk of superiority to the face of most Americans. The quality of most Japanese products usually was as low as their price. In fact, few imports could match their domestic counterparts, the proud products of Yankee know-how. But by the late 1960s, an invasion of foreign-made goods chiseled a few worry lines into the countenance of U.S. industry. In Detroit, worry was fast fading to panic as the Japanese, not to mention the Germans, began to gobble up more and more of the subcompact auto market. Never one to take a backseat to the competition, Ford Motor Company decided to meet the threat from abroad head-on. In 1968, Ford executives decided to produce the Pinto. Known inside the company as "Lee's car," after Ford president Lee lacocca, the Pinto was to weigh no more than 2,000 pounds and cost no more than $2,000220 Eager to have its subcompact ready for the 1971 model year, Ford decided to compress the normal drafting-board-toshowroom time of about three-and-a-half years into two. The compressed schedule meant that any design changes typically made before production-line tooling would have to be made during it. Before producing the Pinto, Ford crash-tested yarious prototypes, in part to learn whether they met a safety standard proposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to reduce fires from traffic collisions. This standard would have required that by 1972 all new autos be able to withstand a rear-end impact of 20 miles per hour without fuel loss and that by 1973 they be able to withstand an impact of 30 miles per hour. The prototypes all failed the 20 -miles-perhour test. In 1970, Ford crash-tested the Pinto itself, and the result was the same: ruptured gas tanks and dangerous leaks. The only Pintos to pass the test had been modified in some way - for example, with a rubber bladder in the gas tank or a piece of steel between the tank and the rear bumper. Thus, Ford knew that the Pinto represented a serious fire hazard when struck from the rear, even in low-speed collisions. Ford officials faced a decision. Should they go ahead with the existing design, thereby meeting the production timetable but possibly jeopardizing consumer safety? Or should they delay production of the Pinto by redesigning the gas tank to make it safer and thus concede another year of subcompact dominance to foreign companies? Ford not only pushed ahead with the original design but also stuck to it for the next six years. What explains Ford's decision? The evidence suggests that Ford relied, at least in part, on cost-benefit reasoning, which is an analysis in monetary terms of the expected costs and benefits CHAPTER TWO NORMATIVE THEORIES OF ETHICS 87 For its part, Ford has always denied that the Pinto is unsafe compared with other cars of its type and era. The company also points out that in every model year, the Pinto met or surpassed the government's own standards. But what the company doesn't say is that successful lobbying by it and its industry associates was responsible for delaying for seven years the adoption of any NHTSA crash standard. Furthermore, Ford's critics claim that there were more than forty European and Japanese models in the Pinto price and weight range with safer gas-tank position. "Ford made an extremely irresponsible decision," concludes auto safety expert Byron Bloch, "when they placed such a weak tank in such a ridiculous location in such a soft rear end." Has the automobile industry learned a lesson from Ford's experience with the Pinto? Many people would probably answer, yes, carmakers are more concerned about safety these days. That's one reason it shocked the nation to learn in 2014 that General Motors had known for years that defective ignition switches on some of its models prevent their airbags from deploying in crashes. (The bags need to draw on the car's power system.) And yet-for reasons that are still unclearthe company did nothing about the problem, ignoring possible fixes proposed by its engineers and telling customers and accident victims that there was no evidence of a flaw. According to GM, the faulty switches have led to thirteen deaths, but an independent review of federal crash data puts the number of fatalities at 303. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. What moral issues does the Pinto case raise? 2. Suppose Ford officials were asked to justify their decision. What moral principles do you think they would invoke? Assess Ford's handling of the Pinto from the perspective of each of the moral theories discussed in this chapter. (3.) Utilitarians would say that jeopardizing motorists does not by itself make Ford's action morally objectionable. The only morally relevant matter is whether Ford gave equal consideration to the interests of each affected party. Do you think Ford did this? 4. Is cost-benefit analysis a legitimate tool? What role, if any, should it play in moral deliberation? Critically assess the example of cost-benefit analysis given in the case study. Is there anything unsatisfactory Some consumers knew their Pintos were dangerous. about it? Could it have been improved upon in some way? 5. Speculate about Kant's response to the idea of placing a monetary value on a human life. Is doing so ever morally legitimate? 6. What responsibilities to its customers do you think Ford had? What are the most important moral rights, if any, operiling in the Pinto case? 7. Would it have made a moral difference if the savings resulting from not improving the Pinto gas tank had been passed on to Ford's customers? Could a rational customer have chosen to save a few dollars and risk having the more dangerous gas tank? What if Ford had told potential customers about its decision? 8. The maxim of Ford's action might be stated thus: "When the cost of a safety improvement would hurt the bottom line, it's all right not to make it." Can this maxim be universalized? Does it treat humans as ends in themselves? Would manufacturers be willing to abide by it if the positions were reversed and they were in the role of consumers? 9. Should Ford have been found guilty of criminal homicide in the Ulich case? 10. Are carmakers these days concerned enough about safety? Why do you think GM failed to address the ignition switch problem? 11. Is it wrong for business to sell a product that is not as safe as it could be, given current technology? Is it wrong to sell a vehicle that is less safe than competing products on the market? Are there limits to how far automakers must go in the name of safety