For the following case study address the questions in details(no bullets)
1- What is the nature of the product quality problemfaced by Mattel?
2- What organizational practices of Mattel contributedto the problem?
3 What can Mattel do to enhance productquality?
4- Which toys should be recalled? What should the recallstrategy be?
MATTEL ANDTHE TOY RECALLS (A)1
Jay Leno aptly reflected the mood of U.S. consumers during thesummer of 2007. Many Chinese-made goods, such as pet food,toothpaste, seafood, and tires, had been recalled in recent weeks.These recalls began lo severely erode the confidence of U.S.consumers in Chinese-made goods. On July 30, 2007, the seniorexecutive team of Mattel, under the leadership of Bob Eckert, CEO,received reports that the surface paint on the Sarge Cars made inChina contained lead in excess of U.S. federal regulations .2 Itwas certainly not good news for Mattel, which was about to recall967,000 Chinese-made children's character toys, such as Dora, Elmo,and Big Bird, because of excess lead in the paint. Notsurprisingly, the decision ahead was not only about whether torecall the Sarge Cars and other toys that might be unsafe, but alsohow to deal with the recall situation .
TOYINDUSTRY-OVERVIEW
The global toy market was estimatedto be a $71 billion business in 2007 -an increase of about six percent over the previous year .3 About 36 per cent of the globalmarket was concentrated in North America (about $24 billion), butannual sales in this region were growing at a slower pace -aboutone per cent. European markets accounted for about 30 per cent ofthe global toy sales and were growing at about five per cent eachyear. ln contrast, the markets in Asia grew at 12 per cent in 2006,and were expected to grow by 25 per cent in 2007.4 A large part ofthis growth was expected to occur in China and India, whoseburgeoning middle-classes were thriving on the double-digiteconomic growth in their countries.
The toy industry in the UnitedStates had a large nu mber of players . About 880 companiesoperated in the dolls, toys, and games manufacturing industry in2002. This figure was about 10 per cent less than the 1 ,019companies that operated in 1997. Approximately 70 per cent of thetoy companies employed less than 20 persons.5 The industry wasdominated by a few key players such as Mattel, Hasbro, RC2, JAAKSPacific, Marvel, and Lego. The industry leaders were Mattel andHasbro, whose combined sales in 2006 were about US$8 .7 billion .The sales of many other major players were under a billion dollars.Exhibit 1 contains key financial data of some major U.S. toymakers.
Big retailers like Wal -Mart and Target had become major playersin the U.S. toy market. They not only sold the products of othertoy companies such as Mallet, Hasbro, and Lego, but also sourcedtoys directly from China. These toys were often sold u nder theirown brand names . For example, Wal -Mart sold toys under itsKid-Connection brand while Target sold toys under its PlayWonderbrand.6 It was estimated that Wal -Mart accounted for about 25 percent of the toy sales in the United States.7 As a result of theentry of big-box retailers in the toy industry, specialty toyretailers such as Toys'R'Us had steadily lost market share.8 Thetop five retailers sold about 60 per cent of all the toys sold inthe United States.9
Toy markets i n the United Stateswere categorized into multiple segments, such as Action Figures& Accessories, Arts & Crafts, Building Sets, Dolls,Games/Puzzles, f nfant/Preschool Toys, Youth Electronics, Outdoor& Sports Toys, and Plush Vehicles. Of these, theinfant/preschool toy segment was the largest, followed by outdoorand sport toys, and dolls. These segments had largely remainedstagnant over the years. As a result of kids getting old younger(KOOY), the only segment with noticeable growth was youthelectronics. By contrast, video games tha.t were outside thetraditional toy industry ha.d been experiencing remarkable growth.For segment-wise sales of toys in the United States, see Exhibit2.
While the major markets for toys existed in the United Statesand Europe, production was concentrated in Asia, primarily China..About 60 per cent of the toys sold in the world were made inChina.. More than I 0,500 toy makers operated in China. 10 Thesecompanies typically had contacts with large Western toy companies.The toy companies in China formed a complex web of supply chains,with contractors themselves sub-contracting production ofcomponents.,and often, entire products to various companies .
TOY PRODUCTION IN CHINA
Over the years, U.S. toy companiesshifted their production overseas and focused their domesticoperations on product design, marketi ng, research and development,and other high-value activities . As a result, employment i.n thedomestic toy industry declined from 42,300 workers in 1993 to17,400 workers in 2005, while toy imports increa.sed.11Approximately l 0 per cent of the demand for toys in the U .S.market was met by domestic production , while the rest was metthrough imports, primarily from China (see Exhibit 3).12
Chinese toy imports accounted for a full 86 per cent of toyimports to the United States in 2006, up dramatically from 41 percent in 1992. The rise of China came at the expense of other toyexporting countries, whose combined share of toy imports to theUnited States plummeted from 59 per cent to 14 per cent during thesame period. For instance, Japan remained a strong exporter of toysto the United States until a substantial drop around 2001. Despiteits prox·imity to the United States, Mexico had not been able tosustain the up-tick it experienced in 2002. Further, Taiwan andHong Kong toy exports had both been in decline for over adecade.
China's rising share of U.S. toy imports, and more generally,China 's position in the global toy industry, can be attributed tothe lower cost business environment in China. China had attractedtremendous foreign direct investment and outsourcing ofmanufacturing operations . While analysts have often pointed to thephenomenal economic growth in China, they have also noted theresultant pressure on the physical, technical, and human resourceinfrastructures .13 These pressures. some analysts argue, haveresulted in the Chi.nese manufacturers compromising on the productsafety.
According to American regulators, tainted pet food imported fromChina was responsible for deaths of, or injuries to, about 4,000cats and dogs. As a result, regulators initiated the biggest petfood recall in U.S. history. This was followed by worldwide recallsof Chinese toothpaste laced with anti-freeze called diethyleneglycol, which was found to be responsible for nearly 200 deaths inHaiti and Panama. Shortly thereafter, Chinese-made tires werelinked to two deaths in an accident in the United States and wererecalled. The tires lacked a safety feature that prevented tiretreads from splitting and falling apart.14 The spate of recalls ofChinese-made goods began to erode consumer confidence in productsmade in China .
TOYSAFETY
The safety of consumer goods in theUnited States is managed by four federal agencies: (i) the Food andDrug Administration (FDA) has jurisdiction over foods, drugs andcosmetics, (ii) the Department of Transportation oversees thesafety of cars, trucks, motorcycles, and their accessories, such astires and car seats, (iii) the Department of Treasury hasjurisdiction over alcohol, tobacco and firearms, and (iv) the U.S.Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has jurisdiction overabout 15,000 types of consumer products, from microwave ovens tocribs to lawn mowers .15
The safety of toys and other children's products falls withinthe jurisdiction of CPSC, which was created in 1972 by Congress inthe Consumer Product Safety Act to "protect the public againstunreasonable risks of injuries and deaths associated with consumerproducts ."In 2007, the CPSC had an operating budget of $66 millionand a staff of 393 full-time equivalent employees . Its strategicgoals for the year were to reduce deaths and injuries by firehazards , carbon monoxide poisoning hazard, and hazards fromchildren 's products .16 According to CPSC, 22 toy-related deathsand an estimated 220,500 toy-related injuries occurred in 2006.17Based on its analysis, CPSC identified the Top Five Hidden HomeHazards. These hazards were listed 011 the CPSC website to makeconsumers aware of the hazards and avoid injuries due to them . In2007, CPSC listed the following as the top hazards: magnets,recalled products , tip-overs, windows and covering, pool and spadrains.
The CPSC collects information about product safety issues fromsources such as hospitals. doctors, newspaper reports, industryreports, consumer complaints, investigations conducted by itsstaff, and reports from companies. When a company becomes aware ofhazards associated with the products it sold, it is required by lawto immediately inform the CPSC. Based on the infomiation itreceived , CPSC worked in coordination with the companies involvedto recall the hazardous products from the market. Exhibit 4presents the number of toy recalls made by CPSC since 1988. Notsurprisingly, the majority of recalls in recent years involved toysmade in China. See Exhibit S for a list of the toys recalled in theUnited States since the beginning of 2007 . All the toys recalled,with one exception, were made in China. Seven of the recalls were aresult of excess lead in the surface paint of the toys.
Lead in children's products poses a serious hazard becauseexposure to lead can affect almost every organ and system in thehuman body. Children exposed to h igh levels of lead can sufferfrom damage such as IQ deficits, attention deficit hyperactivitydisorder, motor skills, and reaction time. Considering the damagesthat lead can cause to humans, particularly child ren, the U.S.government Limited the permissible amount of lead in products.Under the Consumer Safety Product Act 1972, lead in productsaccessible to children should not be greater than 600 parts permillion (ppm).The standards for permissible lead in other productsva1y depending on the usage and amount of lead in the product thatis accessible.
Although lead use is banned or restricted in many developedcountries, the same is not true for developing countries. Indeveloped countries, the only source of lead exposure to childrenis from paint. In contrast, lead exposure in developing countriesoccurs due to lead gasoline, ceramics, mining, batteries, and evenmedication and cosmetics. Manufacturers use paint with a highpercentage of lead because it is highly resistant to corrosion,extremely malleable, and has poor electrical conductivity. Inaddition, paint with higher lead is heavy and bright, makingproducts such asjewelry more appealing to consumers.
While excess lead in toys and other children's products is anissue of concern, CPSC has identified another major hazardassociated with small magnets in toys. Due to the availability ofpowerful rare-earth magnets at cheap prices. the manufacturersbegan to use them in many toys, such as building blocks andjewelry. On some of these products, the magnets came loose. If achild swallowed more than one magnet, they could attach to eachother and cause intestinal perforations and blockage, which can befatal. In April 2006, CPSC and Rose Art Industries recalled 3.8million Magnetix magnetic building sets following the death of a20-month-old boy after he swallowed magnets that twisted his smallintestine and created a blockage. In addition, several otherchildren required surgery and intensive care to remove the magnetsthey swallowed .18
Following the recall of Magnetix building sets, Rose ArtIndustries redesigned its building sets to cover the magnets andreinforced these with resins so that the magnets could not bedetached from the building set. Further, they changed the age suitability of their product to six years or older and provided newwarnings about the dangers associated with ingesting magnets .19The recall of Magnetix was followed by another five recalls of toysthat contained small magnets that detached . One of those recallsinvolved 2.4 million Polly Pocket play sets (an additional 2million sets were sold worldwide), which was prompted by 170reports of magnets coming loose and three children who swallowedthe magnets requiring surgical care.20 The Polly Pocket play sets,recalled on November 21, 2006, were made by Mattel and sold betweenMay 2003 and September 2006.
MATTEL- THE N0.1 TOY MAKER IN THEWORLD
With a vision to provide "the world 's premier toy brands -todayand tomorrow," Mattel "designs, manufactures, and markets a broadvariety of toy products worldwide through sales to its customersand directly to consumers."2 1 Mattel's position as a leader in theglobal toy industry was so formidable that Mattel 's internationalbusiness division, with gross sales of $ 2.7 billion in 2006, wouldbe the industry 's third largest company, if it was a separatecompany, and Mattel 's U.S. business with $3.4 billion would stillbe No.1.22
Mattel was an industry leader notonly by its sales, but also through its pioneering efforts to be agood corporate citizen . In 1996, Mattel initiated its GlobalManufacturi ng Principles, which aimed to ensure responsiblemanagement practices used in Mattel's fuctories as well as by itsvendors. Mattel's factories were audited by the lntemational Centerfor Corporate Accountability , an independent body, and its resultsmade publicly available by Mattel. Mattel engaged in philanthropicactivities through Mattel Children's Foundation in 37 countries. Itwas named one of the top J OO Best Corporate Citizens by CROMagazine i n 2006. More saliently, Mattel's corporate governancereceived the highest global rating of I 0 by Governance MetricsInternational (GMJ), which placed the company among the top one percent of more than 3,400 global companies.
The journey of Mattel, however,began modestly in 1944, when Harold Matson and Elliot Handler beganto make toys out of a converted garage in California. They namedthe company Mattel, using letters from their last and first names.Matson sold his share to Elliot Handler and his wife, Ruth Handler,who incorporated the company in 1948. Mattel's first products werepicture frames and doll house fumiture.23 Jts first big product wasa mass-produced, and thus, inexpensive music box, which establishedMattel firmly in the toy business . The introduction of Barbie in1959,and Ken two years later, propelled company growth . Theproducts introduced later, such as Hot Wheels, went further toestablish Mattel's position as an industry leader. Mattel went public in 1960.
Mattel 's products were organized in three different businessgroups:(i) Mattel Girls & Boys Brands, which includes brandslike Barnie dolls and ac.cessories, Polly Pocket, Hot Wheels,Matchbox, Batman, CARS, and Superman. (ii) Fisher-Price Brands,consisting of brands such as Fisher-Price, Little People, SesameStreet, Dora the Explorer, Go-Diego-Go!, Winnie the Pooh, and PowerWheels. (iii) American Girl Brands , with brands such as Just LikeYou and Bitty Baby. In the United States alone, the sales of thesethree groups in 2006 were: Mattel Girls & Boys Brands -$1.57billion, Fisher-Price Brands -$1.47 billion, and American GirlBrands -$0.44 billion. About 45 per cent of Mattel 's sales wereaccounted for by three major buyers: Wal-Mart, Toys'R'Us, andTarget. In addition to its principal competitors, such as Hasbroand RC2, Mattel also competed with a large num ber of smallercompanies that made toys, v ideo games, and consumer electronics,and pu blished children's books.
Jn the 1990s, Mattel made a num ber of significant acquisitions,including Fisher -Price (1993, leader in pre school segment),Kransco (1994, made battery-powered ride-on vehicles), Tyco (1997,made Tickle Me Elmo and Matchbox cars), Pleasant Company (1998,mail-order firm that made American Girl-brand books, dolls,andclothing), and Bluebird Toys (1998, made toys such as Polly Pocketand The Tiny Disney Collection). Mattel 's acquisition of TheLearning Company, a leading educational software maker, in 1999 ata cost of $3.6 billion proved to be troublesome. The company lostmoney and was later sold. Mattel also made a hostile bid to acquireHasbro, the second-largest toy company. This bid, made in 1996,failed to materialize .
The toy industry is different from other industries on two majorcounts. First, toy sales are seasonal. Most sales occurred duringthe third and last qua11er of the year, which coincide with thetraditional holiday period. Second, there is a lot of uncertaintyaround new product success. It was difficult, almost impossible, topredict whether a particular toy would be liked by children . Notsurprisingly, many companies in the toy industry made millions withone succ.essful toy and also went bankrupt with one bigfailure.
Over a long period, Mattel hadmanaged the pecul iarities of the toy industries well with a number of innovative and often revolutionary ideas. Traditionally, theretailers promoted toys during the holiday season and toymanufacturers had little, if any, role to play. In 1955, Matteltied up with ABC Television and sponsored a 15-minute segment ofWalt Disney 's Mickey Mouse Club for one full year. At that time,Mattel 's revenues were only $5 million, but it paid $500,000 forthe sponsorship. The sponsorship quickly established a continuousconnection for Mattel with the kids and gave it an opportunity toinfluence the buying habits of its consumers. Not surprisingly,this move changed the nature of marketing in the toy industry.Also, for Mattel, it paved the way for further partnerships withentertainment companies to produce character toys.
Mattel entered into licensingagreements to make toys based on the characters owned by companiessuch as Disney, Warner Brothers, Viacom (Nickelodeon), OriginProducts, and Sesame Workshop. These agreements gave the companyaccess to characters such as Winnie the Pooh, Disney Princesses,CARS, Dora the Explorer, Go-Diego-Go!, Sponge Bob SquarePants,Polly Pocket, Batman, Superman, and Elmo. Jn 2005, Mattel partneredwith Scholastic Entenainment to produce educational learningsystems. Not only did lllattel license characters, but alsoIicensed some of its core brands to other non-toy companies todesign and develop an array of products sporting the core brandnames . These deals included Barbie eyewear for little girls (withREM Eyewear), Hot Wheels apparel and accessories (with lnnovoGroup), Barbie video games (with Activision), and CD Players,teaming laptops, and MP3 players .
Recently , Mattel was trying toreduce its reliance o.n its big customers, such as Wal-Mart,Target, and Toys'R'Us, through internet and catalogue sales.24Traditionally, toy companies relied on point-of-sale (POS) data toforecast demand for toys. With its Hot Wheels brand, Mattelrealized that variety was the key driver of the sales andintroduced a rolli ng mix strategy. This strategy involved changingthe physical 72-car assortment mix by seven to eight per cent everytwo weeks. This changed the nature of its practices and instead ofrelying on POS data, Mattel only needed to design the varieties andsupply an assortment pack to the retailer .25
Mattel designed and developed toys in its corporate headquarters. ln 2006, Mattel spent US$174 million on in-house product designand development. 111 contrast, the company spent US$261 million onroyalties and US$65 J million on advertising. Mattel manufacturedproducts in its own factories as well as through third partymanufacturers. Also, it marketed the products purchased fromunrelated companies that designed, developed, and manufacturedthose products .
Offshoring the Toy Production
Mattel 's principal manufacturingfacitities were located in China, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia ,and Mexico. It closed its last toy factory in the U.S., originallypart of its fisher-Price divisions, in 2002 .26 Mattel produced itscore brands, such as Barbie and Hot Wheels, in company-ownedfacilities , but used third-party manufacturers to produce itsnon-core brands. It used third-party manufacturers in a number ofcountries, including the United States, Mexico, Brazil, India, NewZealand, and Australia. This manufacturing mix minimized Mattel'srisk and gave it focus and flexibility. The core brands were astaple business, while the non-core brands tended to be thoseproducts that were expected to have a short market life. Thenon-core brands were typically associated with popular moviecharacters and had a life of one year.21 The development of newtoys was done at Mattel 's corporate headquarters. Outsourcing forthe manufacturing of non-core brand toys followed a strictmulti-step process . The design teams created a bid packagecontaining the new product's blueprint and engineeringspecifications. It often contained a physical model. After theselection of a vendor, the company established the vendor'sproduction infrastructure. At this point, Mattel assumedresponsibility for the cost of tooling. The vendor then produced 50units as "First Shots"to verify if any tool modifications wererequired.This was followed by one or more "Engineering Pilot,"depending on the toy's complexity, and the "Final EngineeringPilot." After this, a "Production Pilot'' of 1,000 units was runusing the entire assembly line to run the product. Finally,the"Production Start''phase began only when the new toy met designcompliance .28
Mattel and its vendors manufacturedabout 800 million products each year. Approximately half of thetoys Mattel sold were made in its own plants, a higher proportionthan other large toy makers . Also, Mattel made a larger percentageof its toys outside China than other large toy companies. Mattel 'smanufacturing and offshoring strategy was developed over a periodof five decades. The company made its first Barbie doll in Asia in1959. Since then , Mattel managed the risks of offshored operationsby employing a mix of company-owned and vendor-owned manufacturingfacilities all over Asia .
In China alone, Mattel had contracts with approximately 37principal vendors who made toys for the company.29 The principalvendors further used smaller companies for the full or pa11ialproduction of toys. As a result, the supply chains in China werelong and complex. According to some estimates , about 3,000 Chinesecompanies made Mattel products .30 However, Mattel had directcontact only with the principal vendors.
A RECALLUNDERWAY
In June 2007, a French directimporter of Mattel 's products , Auchan, performed pre-shipmenttests with the help of Intertek, an independent laboratory. Thesetests revealed that Mattel's toys, made by vendor Lee DerIndustrial Company, contained lead above permissible limits.lntertek sent the test results, on June 8, 2007, to Mattelemployees in China. Consequently, Mattel employees contacted LeeDer instructing it to correct the problem and provide anothersample for testing. Another test by Intertek on June 29, forAuchan, on the same toy produced by Lee Der had passed thetest.
On June 27, 2007, Mattel 's call center in the United Statesreceived a report from a consumer, who informed them that a hometest kit found excessive lead in Mattel 's toys. These were alsomanufactured by Lee Der. Following this, Mattel tested five samplesof Lee Der toys and found on July 6 that three of them containedexcess lead. As the testing was underway, Auchan informed Mattel onJuly 3 about lead violations in another toy made by Lee Der. Assoon as the test results were out, Mattel employees in Chinanotified Lee Der and stopped accepting products made by Lee Der.Further tests on the toy samples collected from Lee Der wereconducted on July 9 in Mattel's own laboratories, which revealedthat nine of the 23 samples of Lee Der toys contained excess lead:in surface paint.
Mattel 's employees in China notified the senior management teamat corporate headquarters on July 12 about the issues with Lee Derproducts . Following this, Mattel management ordered an immediatesuspension of all shipments of products made by Lee Der. Furtherinvestigatio11s by Mattel revealed that the nonconformi ng leadlevels were because of a yellow pigment in paint used on portionsof toys manufactured by Lee Der.31
Lee Der Industrial Company was located in Foshan City ofGuangdong Province, where thousands of small toy factories existed.The company was founded by two Chinese entrepreneurs, ChengShu-hung and Xie Yuguang. Mattel first used Lee Der for making asmall batch of educational toys in 1993. By July 2007, Lee Deremployed approximately 2,500 people and made toys almostexclusively for Mattel. With annual sales of about $25 million, LeeDer was about to open a new $5 million plant.32
Lee Der had purchased its paint from Dongxing New EnergyCo.since 2003. The owner of Dongxing was a good friend of ChengShu-bung. In April 2007, D011gxing ran out of yellow pigment andsourced about 330 pounds of it for $1,250 from Dongguan ZhongxinToner Powder Factory . Then, Dongxing supplied the paint to LeeDer, which used it in Mattel 's toys. Initial reports suggestedthat Dongguan Zhongxin Toner Powder Factory was fake and that itsowners were not traceable.33
An essential component of Mattel 'scontracts with its vendors is that the products made by vendorscomply with applicable safety standards . Mattel had systems thatrequired the vendors to either purchase paint from a list of eightcertified vendors in China or test for compliance each batch of thepai nt purchased from a non-certified vendor . Mattel alsoconducted audits of certified paint suppliers and vendors to ensurethat Mattel 's requirements were being followed.The frequency ofaudits depended on Mattel 's prior experience with the suppliersand vendors.
Following its investigations, Mattelfiled an initial report with the CPSC on July 20 and followed it upwith another on July 26, indicating that it would like to is·sue arecall of all the products manufacnired by Lee Der between April19, 2007 (the date when Lee Der took delivery of the lead-taintedpaint from its supplier), and July 6, 2007, the date when Mattelstopped accepting products from Lee Der.34 Work on this recall wasunderway and Mattel and the CPSC were scheduled to announce therecall on August 2, 2007. See Exhibit 6 for the press releaseannouncing the recall expected to be issued by the CPSC. Mattel hadalready informed big retailers such as Wal-Mart and Toys 'R'Us ofthe impending recall. The retailers pulled the toys off theirshelves and flagged the cash registers so that customers could notbuy the toys from the stores.35
ANOTHER INSTANCEOF LEAD AND FURTHERREPORTS OF LOOSE MAGNETS
While Mattel was prepari ng toannounce its recall, on July 30, 2007, it found that paint on Sargecars contained excess lead. The Sarge cars were made for Mattel byEarly Light Industrial Company, Ltd. of Hong Kong, which made themin its manufacturing facility located in Pinghu, China.36 EarlyLight had supplied toys to Mattel for 20 years.37 Only furtherinvestigation would be able to clarify where exactly in the supplychain the problem originated, and why . Initial reports indicatedthat approximately 250,000 Sarge cars made between May 2007 andAugust 2007 may have been affected with lead paint.
After the November 2006 recall ofeight different Polly Pocket play sets made in China for theproblem of magnets coming loose, Mattel reinforced the magnets. bylocking them in the toys rather than gluing them. Nonetheless, inrecent months, Mattel had received a few hundred reports of magnetscoming loose from a number of play sets sold before Novem ber 2006.The play sets affected with magnet problems were: (i) fiftyadditional models of Polly Pocket play sets (about five million ofthese play sets were sold between March 2003 and November 2006),(ii) Batman and One Piece action figures (about 350,000 toys soldbetween June 2006 and June 2007), (iii) Barbie and Tamier play sets(about 683,000 toys sold between May 2006 - July, 2007), and (iv)Doggie Day Care play sets (about one million sold between July 2004and July 2007).
Recalls are a nightmare to companies for several reasons. First,the recalls pose major logistics challenges as the company needs toestablish a set-up to handle the recalls . Second, the company hasto deal with regulators who tend to push the company to ensure thatnot only a recall is issued, but the products in consumers' handsare actually returned to the company. Third, recalls are oftenviewed as an admission of guilt and open the company to consumerlitigations. Finally, recalls damage the reputation of the companyand result in increased costs, lost sales, and stock priceerosion.
Mattel and Fisher Price were not new to recalls. In their longhistory, they had recalled products in the past (see Exhibit 7).Nevertheless, the current situation seemed entirely new, complex,and challenging. It was not clear if and which products needed tobe recalled . As importantly, how could the company minimize thenegative consequences that were germane to any product recall?Finally, how could the company ensure such recalls did notrecur?
