15.5. Consider a bundling problem where the principal is theseller of a good with a value function v = t − 2 q where t is theprice charged for a bundle and 2 q is the cost of the bundle thatcontains q units of the √ good. A buyer of type θ has a utilityfunction u ( q , t ) = θ q − t , where θ is either 16 or 20 withprobability 0.5 each. The buyers reservation utility is zero. (a)(b) Calculate the optimal bundles, ( q L formation. Calculate theoptimal bundles, ( q ∗ L information. , t ˆ L ) and ( q ˆ H , t ∗ L, ˆ t H ) , under full inˆ ) and ( q ∗ H , t ∗ H ) , underasymmetric
